The English courts have been busy during the first part of 2018. The Supreme Court has revisited the issue of service of a claim form once again, providing useful tips for claimants.Disclosure, often the most costly part of the litigation process, has also been the subject of further case law, in particular how e-disclosure should be managed. The courts have revisitedissues relating to freezing injunctions and security for costs, two important tools in a litigator’sarmoury. There has also been a case on the English courts’ approach to dealing with letters of request, a useful support for foreign proceedings where documents and witnesses are locatedwithin the jurisdiction of the English courts.
Many thanks to Clyde & Co, (www.clydeco.com) for permission to reproduce.
The Asbestos Victims Support Groups Forum (UK)v Cape Distribution Limited & Ors [2017] EWHC2103 (QB)
Non-party entitled to access to documents filed at court
Master McCloud has held that documents “filed” onthe court record which are read in court can be accessed by non-parties provided the non-party has alegitimate interest. Documents on the record of thecourt which are not read in court are subject to amore stringent test, namely, there must be stronggrounds for thinking that access is necessary in theinterests of justice.
The principle of open justice is engaged even if a casesettles before judgment. In this case, filed paper bundles were records of the court. However, a bundleprovided solely in electronic form via a documentmanagement system (and which contained discloseddocuments) was not a bundle filed at court, and sodid not fall within the scope of CPR r5.4C “because‘filing’ required delivery to the court office and in anyevent CPR 5.5 provided that a ‘practice direction maymake provision for documents to be filed or sent tothe court’ by electronic means and there was no provision for electronic filing of bundles”.
It was irrelevant that the parties had agreed a confidential settlement. This point should be borne inmind when documents are filed at court. If documents other than statements of case have been filedat court (and filing does not include providing documents in electronic form, where no order for electronic filing has been made), they may be vulnerableto an order allowing access to non-parties eventhough they are later made the subject of confidentiality obligations as between the parties themselves(and even though they may not have been read incourt).
John Michael Sharp v Sir Maurice Victor Blank[2017] EWHC 3390 (Ch)
Court considers revision of a costs budget and themeaning of a “significant development”
Costs budgets cover costs to be incurred (not costs already incurred). PD3E para 7.6 provides that “Eachparty shall revise its budget in respect of future costsupwards or downwards, if significant developmentsin the litigation warrant such revisions … The courtmay approve, vary or disapprove the revisions havingregard to any significant developments which haveoccurred since the date when the previous budgetwas approved or agreed”.
This case involved seven claims that were subject to agroup litigation order and the claimants applied fora costs management order. Total budgeted costsamounted to just under £37 million. The defendantssubsequently asserted that certain significant developments required them to revise their budget andthe claimants refused to agree to the revisions.
Chief Master Marsh held that the court has jurisdiction to revise a budget taking the last agreed or approved budget as the base reference point: “Costswhich have been incurred since the date of the lastagreed or approved budget (or the antecedent date)that relate to significant developments are, for thepurposes of revision, placed in the estimated columnsof the revised Precedent H in one or more phase. Insome cases, it may not be obvious where they go (forexample a late application for security for costs) but Ican see no reason why Precedent H may not beadapted as necessary to accommodate work that doesnot easily fit in”.
The following factors were found to be “significantdevelopments” in this case:
(a) the trial timetable hadbeen extended by a total of 48 business days;
(b) anapplication for specific disclosure had resulted in a large number of documents that had to be reviewed;and
(c) the claimants had served an expert’s reportwhich was a change from the agreed basis uponwhich expert evidence was to be provided.
However,the following factors were found not to be “significantdevelopments”:
(a) the claimants’ application for thirdparty disclosure;
(b) questions put to the defendants’experts by the claimants; and
(c) modest adjustmentsto the claimants’ case following a change in approachby the claimants’ expert.
Triumph Controls UK Ltd & Ors v Primus International Holding Co & Ors [2018] EWHC 176(TCC)
Judge criticises unilateral decisions taken by aparty during the disclosure process and orders afresh manual review
The defendants sought two orders from the court following the claimants’ disclosure: (1) an order that theclaimants provide a list of 860,000 folders and filepaths to the defendants so that they could identifywhether any additional folders or file paths ought tohave been searched; and (2) an order that theclaimants undertake a manual review of the balanceof 220,000 documents (out of a total of 450,000)which had been identified as potentially disclosablefollowing a keyword search. The parties had agreedon keywords but the claimants had unilaterally useda Computer Assisted Review (“CAR”) to conclude thatonly 0.38% of these documents would be relevant
The first order was refused by Coulson J. Althoughthe claimants had acted without consulting the defendants (and it would have been better to have consulted), the process had been clearly set out in theclaimants’ original list of documents and so the defendants had had 17 months to raise this complaint.In any event, this method had been sensible and proportionate on the facts, especially as the defendantshad been unable to identify any obviously missingfolders/file paths.
In relation to the second order, Coulson J held thatboth the CAR exercise and the sampling exercise thatit produced, had not been transparent or independently verifiable. The Electronic Documents Questionnaire had referred to a manual review of alldocuments and “At no time have the claimants provided relevant details as to how the CAR was set up orhow it was operated. In circumstances where the decision to use the CAR was unilateral, and where thedefendants had no input into it at all, that is unsatisfactory”. It was also not apparent that there had beenany overseeing senior lawyer. The judge ordered theparties to agree a methodology by which a sample of25% of the 220,000 documents would be manuallysearched. That search was to take no longer thanthree weeks.
Judge criticises unilateral decisions taken by a partyduring the disclosure process and orders a fresh manual review
Although the claimants had acted without consultingthe defendants (and it would have been better to haveconsulted), the process had been clearly set out in theclaimants’ original list of documents and so the defendants had had 17 months to raise this complaint.
Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd v Vgenopoulos& Ors [2018] EWCA Civ 1
Court of Appeal confirms that freezing order obtained abroad can be registered and served inEngland pending an appeal against registration
A bank commenced proceedings in Cyprus andobtained a worldwide freezing order from theCypriot court. It then registered that freezing orderas a judgment of the English High Court (pursuant toArticle 38 of the Judgments Regulation (EC Regulation 44/2001)). The first novel issue in this case waswhether the worldwide freezing order became immediately effective and fully enforceable in Englandor whether it only became effective and fully enforceable if no appeal was brought in respect of theregistration order within two months (or, if an appealwas brought, once that appeal was determined). TheCourt of Appeal held that the order was immediatelyeffective and enforceable.
The second issue was what was meant by “measuresof enforcement” as referred to in Article 47(3) of theJudgments Regulation. Article 47(3) provides thatduring the time specified for an appeal against registration, no “measures of enforcement” may be taken.The issue in this case was whether it meant theprocesses in which the court is involved in securingenforcement, or whether it also included service ofthe worldwide freezing order and/or notification ofthe order to third parties. The Court of Appealfavoured the argument that, as a question of Englishlaw, “enforcement” of a judgment entails the invocation of the process of the English court. However, itdid not need to decide the point because it also heldthat service/notification are not “measures of enforcement” prohibited by Article 47(3) (even if theycontain a penal notice).
PSJC Commercial Bank Privatbank v Kolomoisky& Ors [2018] EWHC 482 (Ch)
Judge rules on what must be disclosed by the respondent following the grant of a freezing order
A worldwide freezing order (“WFO”) granted againstthe respondents contained the standard disclosureobligation to inform the applicant in writing “of all hisassets exceeding [here, £25,000] in value as at the dateof this order, giving the value, location and detail of allsuch assets.” The WFO defined the term “assets” asincluding a chose in action (broadly, a right to sue another party), although it did not give any guidance asto what had to be provided in relation to a chose in action. The respondents had made various loans andthe applicant argued that full disclosure of these hadnot been given, in particular whether the debtorswere likely to be able to repay.
The judge noted that an asset disclosure order shouldonly be made for the purpose of policing, or giving effect to, the WFO and should not go beyond information that is necessary for that purpose. Confidentialitydoes not entitle the respondent to withhold information. She accepted that the court has jurisdiction tomake the order (which might include disclosure ofdocuments), where “such an order is required to enable a claimant, first, to identify the nature and extent of a defendant’s interest in assets, and second, todecide whether and, if so, what further steps it shouldtake to protect its position, such steps being an important aspect of its ability to police the freezingorder”.
The judge refused to order disclosure of loan documents and drew an analogy with details of a bank account: “In such a case the court would requiredisclosure of the bank’s name and location, the nameor names in which the account is held, the accountnumber and the balance in the account, which is theasset for these purposes. What the court will not do isorder the provision of bank statements. They containdetails about the asset but they are not details necessary to understand the nature of the interest in theasset or to enable the freezing order to be policed”. The judge was prepared to order disclosure of thedate on which each contract was entered into and thenature of the goods sold or services provided underthe contracts. Such basic information fell within thescope of “details” for the purposes of the WFO. Thedate of repayment was also a detail which was directlyrelevant to the value of the chose in action and thuswithin “location, value or details”. The applicant wasfurther entitled to know whether the repayment ofmonies due was secured and the estimated value ofany such security. However, although informationabout payments made to date had to be given to theapplicant, the respondent was not required to provide details of future payments
Allergan, Inc v Amazon Medica [2018] EWHC 307(QB)
Judge sets aside order made pursuant to a letter ofrequest from a US Court
This was an application to set aside an order made bya master pursuant to a letter of request issued by aUS court requiring the UK applicant to provide oralevidence and documents.
Cockerill J confirmed that the first step when considering a contentious letter of request is to keep an eyeon the underpinning jurisdiction: “In other words,when talking of compelling oral evidence the comparator is with when a witness summons would beavailable in proceedings in the English Court”. A two-stage test has been laid down in the case of FirstAmerican Corp v Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan [1999],namely: (i) whether the intended witness can reasonably be expected to have relevant evidence and (ii)whether there is an intention to obtain evidence foruse at trial. Unless the US court has considered theEnglish approach and confirmed that the evidence sought is relevant to issues for trial, the English courtis free to scrutinise the request: “It is not the samething at all … when a court issues a letter of requestwithout the defendant being heard, or when theCourt itself says nothing about relevance but simplyrecords the submission of the applicant”.
Here, the letter of request was issued following an unopposed paper application. Although the judge accepted that it could not be said that no considerationof the merits would ever eventually take place in theUS, he went on to find that the timeline gave pausefor thought: “Here we are looking at a stage even before the pre-trial discovery stage. There are as yet nodefined issues; because there is no pleading from theDefendant… Thus it is clear that a part of the purpose of this Letter of Request is investigatory andtherefore impermissible”.
The judge concluded that the English court had nojurisdiction to make the order and the order was setaside. However, he accepted that it was possible, inprinciple, for a letter of request issued at such a stageto meet the relevant test. This case re-affirms that aletter of request should not be treated as a wide-ranging “fishing expedition”, which is investigatory, ratherthan being aimed at obtaining evidence.
JMX v Norfolk and Norwich Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWHC 185 (QB)
Judge considers whether Part 36 offer was a genuineattempt to settle
One of the factors the court can take into accountwhen deciding whether it would be unjust to orderthe usual, enhanced costs consequences following asuccessful Part 36 offer is: “whether the offer was agenuine attempt to settle the proceedings”. In thiscase, the claimant offered to accept 90% of his claimand went on to beat that offer at trial. The defendantargued that the usual Part 36 costs consequencesshould not be applied because the offer “did not reflect any realistic assessment of the risks of the litigation” (i.e. it was a significant under-evaluation of thelitigation risk) and the offer letter did not explain whyonly a 10% discount was being offered (somethingwhich the White Book suggests would be prudent insuch a situation).
The judge held that an argument about how a partyperceives the litigation risk will hardly ever succeed:“How one side perceives the risks in a piece of litigation … will almost invariably be different from theway the other side perceives them”. As such, the courtshould adopt a broad brush approach, rather than amini-trial as to how the case should have looked tothe offeror at the time of the offer.
The offer here had been a genuine attempt to settle:10% is not a token discount and, as the claim ran intoseveral million pounds, it also represented a significant amount of money. The judge was also critical ofthe parties’ written submissions about what had taken place at negotiation meetings. The judge alsoawarded interest on indemnity costs of 5% above baserate.
The argument that a successful Part 36 offer was nota genuine attempt to settle is a very difficult one torun. In Jockey Club v Willmott Dixon [2016], an offerof 95% of the claim in an “all or nothing” case washeld to be a genuine attempt to settle, even thoughthe claimant was unlikely to have been awarded 95%at trial. In reaching that decision, the court took intoaccount not only the percentage of the claim beingdiscounted but also what that equated to in monetaryterms. Only “extreme” offers are likely to fail.
Bilta (UK) LTD (in Liquidation) & Ors v RoyalBank of Scotland & Ors [2017] EWHC 3535 (Ch)
Judge considers whether claim to litigation privilege had been made out
The defendant in this case sought to withhold documents (including transcripts of interviews with its employees) from disclosure on the basis that they werecovered by litigation privilege (the litigation in question being a different one from the present case –namely, litigation between the defendant andHMRC).
In order to qualify for litigation privilege, it must beshown that the relevant communications were made“for the sole or dominant purpose of conducting thatlitigation”. In this case, the interviews took place afterHMRC had commenced an investigation into the defendant’s activities. The claimant argued that the defendant’s internal investigation after that point hadbeen conducted to inform itself of its position and topersuade HMRC not to issue an assessment. The defendant countered that a letter sent from HMRC to itbefore the interviews took place had changed the investigation into a tax dispute.
The judge agreed with the defendant. It did not matter if the litigation purpose was the sole or merely thedominant purpose of the interview. There is no general legal principle that attempts to settle will preventthe litigation purpose being the dominant purpose. Here, the defendant was not spending large amountsof money in the hope of dissuading HMRC from issuing an assessment, and even if it was, that was onlya subsidiary purpose: “Here, fending off the assessment was just part of the continuum that formed theroad to the litigation that was considered, rightly, as itturned out, to be almost inevitable”. In short, the interviews had taken place because the defendant was“gearing up for the litigation”.
This case confirms that the question of whether communications are produced for the sole or dominantpurpose of aiding or conducting litigation is necessarily highly fact-sensitive. The key issue is why thedocument has come into existence: was it to aid potential litigation or was there an additional, and entirely separate, purpose (of equal importance to theparty)?
Marcura Equities FZE & Anor v Nisomar VenturesLtd & Anor [2018] EWHC 523 (QB)
One
Court considers whether settlement meeting waswithout prejudice save as to costs
One of the issues in this case was the status of a settlement meeting between the parties before theyreached an agreement a year later, and whether ajudge was entitled to take into account what was saidat that meeting.
The parties had agreed that the meeting was withoutprejudice, but they had not discussed whether it waswithout prejudice save as to costs (“WPSATC”). Reference was made to the Court of Appeal decision ofGresham Pension Trustees v Cammack [2016], inwhich it was said that the parties had to agree that ameeting was WPSATC if they did not want the general rule precluding the admission of without prejudice communications to apply. The judge in this casesaid that he was not required to decide whether theCourt of Appeal meant that WPSATC status can onlyever be achieved by an express statement. That wasbecause he found that there was nothing in the surrounding circumstances which could give rise to aninference in this case that the meeting was intendedby both parties to be WPSATC, despite nothing express being said to that effect. Accordingly, he did notread the evidence as to what happened at the meeting.
Premier Motorauctions Ltd & Anor v Price WaterhouseCoopers LLP & Anor [2017] EWCA Civ1872
Court of Appeal orders security for costs whereATE insurance policy did not contain an anti- avoidance provision
The defendants applied for a security for costs orderon the basis that the claimant is a company and there“is reason to believe that it will be unable to pay thedefendant’s costs if ordered to do so” (CPRr25.13(2)(c)). After the claim form was issued, theclaimant obtained ATE insurance cover. The issue inthis case was whether the security for costs ordershould be made in light of the ATE insurance cover. At first instance, the judge held that the existence ofan ATE policy should be taken into account when asking whether there is reason to believe that theclaimant will be unable to pay an adverse costs order(i.e. the threshold jurisdictional question), rather thanonly after a security for costs order has been made(and it is necessary to decide whether the policy is asgood as cash or a bank guarantee). On the appeal,the Court of Appeal did not disagree with that approach and held that “an appropriately framed ATEinsurance policy can in theory be an answer to an application for security”.
The judge had refused to find that there was reasonto believe that the ATE policy in question would notrespond, and in particular, that the insurers wouldavoid for non-disclosure or misrepresentation. Thatwas despite the underlying case involving doubtsabout the credibility of the claimant’s managing director. The Court of Appeal allowed the appealfrom that finding. In doing so, the Court of Appealheld that “Of course it does not follow that insurerswould avoid but the difficulty is that neither the defendants nor the court has any information withwhich to judge the likelihood of such avoidance. Oneknows that ATE insurers do seek to avoid their policies if they consider it right to do so”.
A key point taken into account by the Court of Appeal was that the policy did not contain any anti-avoidance provisions. It was also unimpressed by theclaimant’s failure to procure a deed of indemnityfrom the insurers, which would have confirmed thatinsurers were giving up their right to avoid. Reference was also made to the recent case of Holyoake vCandy [2017] in which, on a different point, it wasconcluded that even an ATE policy which providedfor avoidance only in cases of fraud was not suitableto stand as fortification for a cross-undertaking indamages. Accordingly, there was jurisdiction to ordersecurity for costs and the Court of Appeal ordered security of £4 million to be provided.
Danilina v Chernukhin & Ors [2018] EWHC 39(Comm)
Judge considers security for costs applicationagainst an individual resident outside the EU/EEA
The defendants sought security for costs against theclaimant on the basis that she was an individual resident (broadly) outside of the EU/EEA (CPRr25.13(2)(a)). The mere fact that a claimant is residentoutside the EU/EEA does not entitle a defendant tosecurity: “the establishment of residence is merely atrigger”. The court must then consider the impact onany future enforcement of a costs order.
In Ras Al Khaimah v Bestfort [2016], the Court of Appeal held that it is usually sufficient for an applicantsimply to adduce evidence to show that there is a “realrisk” that it will not be in a position to enforce a costsorder and that, in all the circumstances, it is just tomake an order for security. If enforcement will bepossible but there is a real risk that it will take longeror cost more than enforcement in the EU/EEA, security will usually be ordered to cover that risk only.However, if there is a real risk of non-enforcement,the court may instead order security to cover the fulllikely recoverable amount of costs to date and thenlater to trial.
Here, there was a risk of non-enforcement in Russia,but the greater probability was that enforcementwould be possible but take longer and be more difficult. The judge held that in such circumstances “onehere combines the position as part of a sliding scalewith the various discretionary factors (to the extentrelevant). Thus .. a marginal risk in combination withlack of probity or established bad conduct may justifya full securing of costs”.
On the facts of the case, the judge concluded that “this[was] a case where a single order of a substantialamount of security to reflect the real (but small) risk of non-enforcement and greater (but less financiallyextensive) risk of increased cost and delay [was] thecorrect approach”.
Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12
Supreme Court refuses to validate service of aclaim form
The claimant, a litigant in person, sought to serve hisclaim form on the solicitors appointed by the defendant’s insurers by email. Under the CPR, service byemail is only allowed where the recipient has previously confirmed in writing that it is willing to acceptservice in this way. This was not the case here. Thesolicitors informed the litigant in person that servicewas not valid but only after the time for service hadexpired (and the claim was time-barred). When theclaimant’s application under CPR r6.15(2), for anorder that the steps he had taken to bring the claimform to the attention of the defendant should countas good service, was refused, he appealed to the Courtof Appeal. That appeal was dismissed and so theclaimant appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has now rejected that appeal bya majority of 3:2. In doing so, the Supreme Courtconfirmed that it is not enough that the claim formhas come to the attention of the defendant: “This isbecause a bright line rule is necessary in order to determine the exact point from which time runs for thetaking of further steps or the entry of judgment indefault of them”. Nor is there usually any reason tojustify applying to litigants in person a lower standardof compliance (although it may affect the position ina marginal case).
The solicitors were not under any duty to advise theappellant that service was invalid and “Nor could theyproperly have done so without taking their client’s instructions and advising them that the result might beto deprive them of a limitation defence. It is hardlyconceivable that in those circumstances the clientwould have authorised it.”
The conclusion that the Supreme Court drew wasthat the appellant had not allowed himself enoughtime to rectify any mishap, having attempted to serveboth at the end of the limitation period and at the endof the claim form’s period of validity: “A person whocourts disaster in this way can have only a very limitedclaim on the court’s indulgence… By comparison, theprejudice to [the defendant] is palpable. They will retrospectively be deprived of an accrued limitation defence if service is validated”.
DDM v Al-Zahra Pvt Hospital & Ors [2018] EWHC346 (QB)
Court grants extension of time to serve claim formout of the jurisdiction
The claimant experienced delays in effecting serviceof the claim form on the defendants, including a hospital in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”). The Foreign Process Section (“FPS”) of at the Royal Courts ofJustice advised the claimant that service in the UAEcan take between six and 12 months, or more, andthat an extension of time to serve should be sought (under CPR r7.6). Two extensions of time weregranted but the second one was subsequently setaside. The claimant appealed against that decisionand that appeal was allowed.
The defendants referred to Foran v Secret Surgery[2016], in which the judge held that an extension oftime should not have been granted in a service out ofthe jurisdiction case. The judge in that case said thatthe six-month period for service out was generous,but in this case Foskett J commented that “I respectfully question whether the 6-month period allowedfor service outside the jurisdiction does cater in all circumstances for the difficulties of effecting servicethrough the FPS process”. Furthermore, theclaimant’s solicitors in Foran had been criticised fornot pursuing matters with the FPS to see how servicecould be expedited, but the judge in this case said thatthe FPS’s website (at least now) makes it clear thatsuch enquiries are “obviously discouraged and,frankly, futile”. Furthermore, where, as in the UAE,alternative means of service are not ordinarily possible, there would be no point in making such enquiries.
A further issue taken into account in this case was thetotal lack of communication by the defendants. Thejudge commented that “in my view, the complete failure of the Defendants to respond at all to these various communications ought to weigh heavily againstthe otherwise important consideration of the expiryof the limitation period”. The defendants’ insurershad initially advised the defendants not to respond tothe claimant and the judge noted that “it does appearthat the hospital itself did react properly to the communications from the Claimant’s solicitors and, perhaps, assumed that the insurers would acknowledgethose communications. That would, of course, havebeen the anticipation of all parties if an insurer in theUK was the recipient of communications such asthese from an insured”. Accordingly, the defendantshad not advised the claimant that a notarised powerof attorney authorising the defendants’ solicitors toact was first required under UAE law, before correspondence could be entered into. The judge was critical of that stance, saying that it had hampered theclaimant in putting its case together.
Prior case law has established that defendants generally do not have to cooperate with a claimant to assistwith service of the claim form. However, here, theissue was that the lack of cooperation prevented theclaimant from formulating its case and drafting theclaim form (which in turn impacted on its ability toserve before the expiry of the limitation period). It isa fairly generous decision for the claimant, but thejudge may have been influenced to some degree bythe nature of the claim, having stated that theprospect of the claimant having to apply to the courtto exercise its discretion to allow the otherwise time-barred claim to proceed was not “an attractive proposition when the effective, lifetime interests of aseriously disabled child are in issue”.
ADR
A working group of the Civil Justice Council has recommended that “the Court should promote the useof ADR more actively at and around the allocationand directions stage. We think that the threat of costssanctions at the end of the day is helpful but that thecourt should be more interventionist at an earlierstage when the decisions about ADR are actuallybeing taken”. However, the group did not go so far asrecommending that ADR should be a mandatorycondition of being able to issue proceedings. A link tothe report can be found here:
Disclosure
Plans have been announced for a two-year pilotscheme on disclosure for the Business and PropertyCourts, i.e. the Commercial Court, TCC, ChanceryDivision and the Financial List, as well as the Businessand Property Courts in Birmingham, Manchester,Leeds, Bristol, Cardiff, Newcastle and Liverpool.
It is anticipated that changes to the CPR will besought in spring 2019. In essence, the changes are intended to ensure greater take-up of the “menu” ofoptions for disclosure which was introduced in 2013(and which, it seems, judges have been reluctant toadopt so far).
The key changes are as follows:
(1) “Standard disclosure” will disappear and there willbe no one “default” order.
(2) “Basic Disclosure” of the documents on which aparty intends to rely (and which are necessary to understand the case) will be given with statements ofcase.
(3) The Electronic Disclosure Questionnaire will bereplaced with a joint Disclosure Review Document(“DRD”). The DRD must be produced after the closeof statements of case and before the first Case Management Conference.
(4) The DRD will include proposals for “ExtendedDisclosure”.
(5) There will be five “Extended Disclosure” Modules,ranging from no disclosure on a particular issue todisclosure of documents which may lead to a train ofenquiry.
(6) The courts should be proactive and not just acceptthe Modules proposed by the parties.
(7) Form H Costs Budgets in relation to disclosure willbe completed after the disclosure order is made (although costs estimates should be provided in theDRD).
Further details can be found here:
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